• Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction
by Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis and Artem Tsikiridis (co-recipient of the SAGT 2017 best paper award), which resolves an open problem in multi-unit auctions by providing the exact bound on the price of anarchy of the uniform price auction for bidders with submodular valuations; • Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings by Alon Eden, Michal Feldman and Adi Vardi (co-recipient of the SAGT 2017 best paper award), which contributes efficient truthful mechanisms for multi-unit auctions selling either divisible and indivisible goods to a set of strategic budgeted bidders with additive valuations arriving over time;
• We are largely indebted to all people and institutions that contributed to the success of both the conference and this special issue. Our warmest thank goes to all of them.
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